Lawtitude

The intricate connection of U.S.-Russia relations has long been defined by a mix of rivalry and cooperation, particularly in the realm of nuclear arms control. Over the past five decades, significant agreements have been reached, yet recent geopolitical upheavals have placed this fragile cooperation in jeopardy. New START, signed on April 8, 2010, in Prague, represents a significant milestone in nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia. Officially entering into force on February 5, 2011, it replaces earlier treaties and serves as a crucial mechanism for verifiably reducing strategic nuclear arsenals.

As we look towards the future, understanding the challenges to arms control and exploring potential pathways for renewed dialogue and cooperation becomes critical.

Historical Cooperation in Arms Control
The genesis of U.S.-Russia arms control can be traced back to the early 1960s. Agreements such as the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), and the numerous iterations of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) framework collectively established a baseline for nuclear stability. These treaties not only led to substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals but also facilitated mechanisms for verification and transparency, which were pivotal during the Cold War. The ability to trust but verify became a cornerstone of these agreements, enabling both nations to mitigate the risks associated with their nuclear stockpiles.

The treaty is a continuation of the bipartisan efforts initiated by past U.S. administrations to reduce nuclear arsenals—a process that began in earnest during the Cold War. Notably, New START is the first verifiable U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control agreement since START I, which came into effect in 1994. Its significance lies in fostering transparency and predictability in U.S.-Russia nuclear relations. On February 3, 2021, both nations agreed to extend New START for an additional five years, ensuring its continuation until February 5, 2026.

Current Landscape: A Shift Towards Uncertainty
The current arms control landscape is starkly different from that of the past. The U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019—predicated on alleged Russian non-compliance—marked a critical turning point. With New START as the last remaining strategic arms control agreement, the stakes have never been higher. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 intensified existing tensions, leading to the suspension of on-site inspections and raising alarm bells over nuclear risk.

In early 2023, President Putin’s announcement to halt participation in New START echoed a broader trend of diminishing trust. The U.S. subsequently ceased daily notifications required under the treaty, signaling a deteriorating environment for dialogue. This unraveling of established arms control frameworks not only raises doubts about the future of bilateral negotiations but also poses broader implications for global security.

The Erosion of Strategic Stability
The implications of this breakdown extend beyond U.S.-Russia relations. The rise of advanced conventional weapons and the modernization of nuclear arsenals in not just the U.S. and Russia but also China suggest a new military landscape—often referred to as the “third nuclear age.” In this context, the erosion of long-standing taboos against nuclear weapon use complicates efforts to maintain strategic stability.

The Strategic Stability dialogue, initiated in June 2021, has stalled amid profound mistrust. With a lack of clear negotiations ahead, the specter of an arms race looms large, overshadowing calls for restraint. This precarious situation necessitates innovative thinking to navigate the complexities of modern security dynamics.

Key Provisions of New START
New START comprises a main treaty text along with a protocol detailing definitions, verification procedures, and technical annexes. Below are its key components:

• Main Treaty Limits
  – Nuclear Warhead Limits: By February 5, 2018, New START imposed a cap of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, representing a significant reduction from previous agreements.
  – Missile, Bomber, and Launcher Limits: The treaty restricts the number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers to 700, with an overall limit of 800 for deployed and non-deployed launchers. This aims to prevent a breakout scenario, ensuring both sides maintain manageable arsenals.
  – Non-Deployed Missiles: While there are no explicit limits on non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, stringent monitoring requirements are enforced, enhancing transparency regarding missile stockpiles.

• Counting Rules
  -Warhead Counting :The counting methodology focuses on the number of re-entry vehicles (RVs) on each missile, rather than an associated number of warheads, enhancing accuracy in monitoring.
  – Delivery Vehicles and Launchers: Each missile and bomber is counted against the established limits, while non-deployed systems are monitored but not numerically limited.

• Monitoring and Verification
  New START incorporates a robust verification framework that includes:
  – Detailed definitions of treaty-limited items and provisions for utilizing National Technical Means (NTM) for verification.
  – A comprehensive database documenting the numbers and locations of treaty-limited items, alongside requirements for regular notifications.
  – On-site inspections to confirm compliance and verify reported information.
  This verification process enhances accountability and deters both parties from exceeding declared limits.

• Ballistic Missile Defense
  New START clarifies that current and future U.S. missile defense programs are not constrained by the treaty’s provisions, although both parties are prohibited from converting ICBM and SLBM launchers into missile defense interceptors.

• Conventional Warheads
  The treaty does not limit the deployment of conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles, with provisions ensuring such deployments still fall within the established limits on warheads and missiles.

• Duration and Withdrawal
  New START has a duration of ten years with the possibility for an additional five-year extension. Either party may withdraw if extraordinary events jeopardize their supreme interests, following a three-month notice period.

Laying the Groundwork for Future Cooperation
Despite the current deadlock, several avenues exist for future arms control efforts:

1. Review Historical Precedents: A comprehensive analysis of past U.S.-Soviet/Russian arms control efforts can yield insights into successful negotiation strategies. For instance, the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which mandated urgent consultations in case of imminent nuclear use, can serve as a model for mitigating escalation risks.
2. Focus on Emerging Technologies: As military technology evolves, understanding the implications of new developments—such as cyber warfare and autonomous weapons—is essential. Historical arms control efforts can inform future discussions on how to address these emerging threats effectively.

3. Assess Perceived Threats: Conducting risk assessments to identify shared perceptions of destabilizing technologies among the U.S., Russia, and China can reveal common interests conducive to dialogue. Engaging in Track 2 discussions with experts from these nations could illuminate overlaps and divergences in threat assessments.
4. Strengthen Existing Frameworks: In the near term, reaffirming commitments to existing treaties, even as they face challenges, is crucial. Exploring lesser-known agreements can provide a foundation for renewed cooperation, reinforcing the remnants of the arms control architecture.

Conclusion
New START is pivotal in enhancing global security through nuclear arms control. Its comprehensive framework establishes critical limits on warheads and delivery systems, introduces rigorous verification mechanisms, and fosters transparency. As the treaty approaches its next review period, it remains an essential element of the ongoing dialogue surrounding nuclear non-proliferation and strategic stability in an increasingly complex international security environment.

The future of U.S.-Russia arms control is indeed fraught with challenges, yet history demonstrates that cooperation, even amid intense rivalry, is possible. By reflecting on past successes and failures, collaboratively addressing emerging threats, and nurturing a new generation of arms control experts, both nations can lay the groundwork for future negotiations. As geopolitical tensions continue to rise, the pursuit of innovative and creative solutions will be paramount in mitigating the risks associated with nuclear weapons, fostering a more stable international security environment.