a) Grounds for and extent of ‘time limitation’ applicable to a Court for taking cognisance of a complaint:

• While considering plea of Panacea Biotec, the Kerala HC relied primarily on Sections 468 and 469 of Code. Section 469 specifies the limitation period (6 months to 3 years) for court to take cognisance of complaint and Section 469 specifies the date of commencement of this limitation period. The Kerala HC was convinced that intelligence branch approached CJM only after expiry of the limitation period in the present case.  
• In reality, the intelligence branch conducted a long-drawn inquiry to trace the entire sequence of commercial transactions involved in supply of the drug and collecting documentary evidence for the complaint. It was only after conclusion of the inquiry that it was in a position to identify all the persons who could be held responsible for the offence of ‘wrong labelling’. It was only in April 2006 that the identities of all the alleged offenders in this case could be established. Clause 1 (c) of Section 469 clearly specifies that the limitation period commences from the date on which the ‘identity of the offender becomes known to the person aggrieved by the offence’. As such, the 3 -year limitation period commences from April 2006 only; the complaint with CJM had been lodged in January 2009, which is within the deadline of April 2009. 
• The nature of the alleged offence namely, wrong labelling, is such that it not only mislead the sellers but also endangered the lives of potential users of the drug which was labelled as a particular vaccine. Section 473 permits any court to take cognisance of an offence even after expiry of limitation period notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision in the Code, provided (i) court is satisfied by the explanation given for delay in filing complaint, or (ii) court finds it necessary to take cognisance of the complaint in the interest of justice.

Based on the above analysis, the Hon’ble SC overruled the Kerala HC order quashing the summons to Panacea Biotec. 

b) Nature of ‘territorial jurisdiction’ applicable to a Court for adjudicating on a complaint:

• Panacea Biotec argued in the HC that they being located in Delhi are outside the jurisdiction of Thrissur CJM and that under Section 202 of the Act, the CJM cannot receive complaint (i) without examination of complainant and witnesses under oath and (ii) without investigation into complaint by a police officer or any person deemed fit, for purpose of deciding if sufficient grounds exist for the complaint. Accepting this argument, HC quashed the CJM summons to Panacea Biotec.
• The drugs inspector (intelligence branch) the complainant in this case, is a Gazetted officer authorised by the state govt to specifically investigate into such offences. In other words, it is on behalf of the state govt that the complaint has been lodged with CJM; such complaints do not require to be taken under oath. Moreover,  he is a ‘public servant’ discharging his official duty.

  Section 200 of Code specifically empowers a public servant discharging his official duty to make the complaint which is exempted from examination under oath. This is an exemption that is not available to a private complainant.

• Recognising the Drug inspector (intelligence branch) as ‘public servant discharging his duty’, the SC recognised his complaint to the CJM and accordingly set aside the Kerala High Court’s order quashing the summons to Panacea Biotec.